Struct ProvenanceManager 

pub struct ProvenanceManager { /* private fields */ }

Implementations

impl ProvenanceManager

pub fn new(key_path: &Path, storage_path: Option<&Path>) -> Result<Self>

pub fn from_signing_key(signing_key: SigningKey) -> Self

pub fn issuer_did(&self) -> &str

pub fn store_record(&self, fact_id: &str, record: ProvenanceRecord)

pub fn get_record(&self, fact_id: &str) -> Option<ProvenanceRecord>

pub fn record_count(&self) -> usize

pub fn record_deletion( &self, fact_id: &str, reason: Option<&str>, ) -> Result<DeletionRecord>

pub fn rotate_key(&mut self, new_key_path: &Path) -> Result<String>

pub fn verify_log_integrity(&self) -> Result<bool>

pub fn revoke_credential(&self, status_index: u64) -> Result<()>

pub fn is_revoked(&self, status_index: u64) -> bool

pub fn create_fact_provenance( &self, fact_id: &str, content: &[u8], source_uri: Option<&str>, ) -> Result<ProvenanceRecord>

Create a full provenance record for a stored fact.

pub fn create_triple_provenance( &self, params: &TripleProvenanceParams<'_>, ) -> Result<ProvenanceRecord>

Create a full provenance record for a stored triple.

pub fn create_batch_provenance( &self, items: &[(&str, &[u8], Option<&str>)], ) -> Result<Vec<ProvenanceRecord>>

pub fn create_store_manifest( &self, store_id: &str, store_data: &[u8], fact_count: usize, dimensions: u32, title: Option<&str>, ) -> Result<StoreManifest>

Create a signed manifest for the entire store.

pub fn verify_fact_provenance( &self, record: &ProvenanceRecord, trust: &TrustStore, ) -> Result<VerificationResult>

Authenticity check: verifies the record’s signatures and requires the key that produced them to be present in trust. A record whose embedded key is not trusted verifies as valid == false even if its signature is internally consistent. Use ProvenanceManager::self_trust to trust only this manager’s own key.

pub fn verify_fact_provenance_self_consistency( &self, record: &ProvenanceRecord, ) -> Result<VerificationResult>

Integrity-only check: verifies the record’s signatures against the key embedded in the record itself. This proves the record has not been altered since signing, but says nothing about who signed it — a record signed by any key passes. For authenticity use ProvenanceManager::verify_fact_provenance with a trust anchor.

pub fn signing_key(&self) -> &SigningKey

pub fn verifying_key(&self) -> VerifyingKey

This manager’s current verifying (public) key.

pub fn self_trust(&self) -> TrustStore

A trust store containing only this manager’s own key. Pass it to the verify methods to authenticate records this manager signed.

pub fn create_sigstore_bundle( &self, content: &[u8], identity: Option<&str>, ) -> Result<SigstoreBundle>

pub fn verify_sigstore_bundle( &self, bundle: &SigstoreBundle, content: &[u8], trusted_key: &VerifyingKey, ) -> Result<()>

Verify a Sigstore bundle against a caller-supplied trusted key. The key embedded in the bundle is ignored: authenticity comes from trusted_key, not from the bundle itself.

pub fn create_cawg_assertion( &self, referenced: &[(String, String, Vec<u8>)], display_name: &str, ) -> Result<Value>

Create a CAWG ICA identity assertion. referenced is (url, alg, raw_hash) and MUST include the hard binding. Returns the cawg.identity assertion JSON.

pub fn verify_cawg_assertion( &self, assertion: &Value, trust: &TrustStore, ) -> Result<Value>

Verify a cawg.identity ICA assertion JSON and require its issuer to be trusted, returning the embedded VC. verify_cawg_ica only proves the assertion is self-consistent (signed by the key its own VC names); the trust anchor establishes that the issuing agent is one the caller accepts. Rejects an assertion whose issuer DID is not in trust.

pub fn keri_event_log(&self) -> &RwLock<KeyEventLog>

pub fn create_keri_interaction(&self, anchors: Vec<Value>) -> Result<KeyEvent>

pub fn verify_keri_log(&self) -> Result<()>

pub fn verify_store_manifest( &self, manifest: &StoreManifest, store_data: Option<&[u8]>, trust: &TrustStore, ) -> Result<VerificationResult>

Authenticity check for a store manifest: verifies its COSE signature and optional store hash, and requires the signing key to be present in trust. See ProvenanceManager::verify_fact_provenance for the self-consistency vs. authenticity distinction.

pub fn verify_store_manifest_self_consistency( &self, manifest: &StoreManifest, store_data: Option<&[u8]>, ) -> Result<VerificationResult>

Integrity-only check for a store manifest: verifies signatures against the key embedded in the manifest. Does not establish authenticity.